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Abstract
Sugar planters in Louisiana during Reconstruction needed to replace the enslaved labor
force that had fled the plantation system after the Civil War. These Louisiana planters
took inspiration from the system of coolie labor in Cuba, wherein exploited Chinese
indentured servants would work on sugar plantation alongside enslaved Africans. The
white Cuban planters’ goal was to racially dilute their plantation labor force, thus making
the existing power structures easier to maintain while avoiding Haitian-style slave
uprising. Sugar planters in Louisiana intended to recreate the Cuban system to compel
Freedmen to work for less than their worth by importing Chinese laborers, whom they
thought would work for lower wages than Freedmen would have accepted otherwise.
The Louisiana coolie experiment was an economic failure for sugar planters due to
Republican intervention, white supremacist rhetoric, and resistance from the Chinese
themselves.

Key Words: Coolie; Chinese; Louisiana; Cuba; sugar plantation; Reconstruction

iii

Introduction
On March 8, 1866, the Italian cargo ship Napoleon Canevero was making her way from
China, specifically the Portuguese colony at Macao, destined for the Peruvian city of Callao. On
board, the vessel housed a crew totaling forty sailors, four hundred tons of cargo containing eight
thousand boxes of Chinese firecrackers, and six hundred sixty-three Chinese coolie laborers
under contract to toil in the lucrative guano caves of Peru. 1 Several hours after setting sail, the
Chinese interpreter on board informed the ship’s mate, Mr. A. F. Faw, that the coolies in the hold
had hatched a plot to take the vessel by force. The plan involved the Chinese cooks in the galley,
who were to poison the water supply used for the officers’ tea, after which the coolies would
overpower the leaderless crew and take command of the ship. However, due to the interpreter’s
information, the officers rounded up four of the ringleaders and had them summarily flogged on
the deck with stiffened bamboo canes. The next morning, the officers discovered that over two
hundred of the laborers were complicit in the mutiny plot, and also the ringleaders, in fact,
numbered thirteen in total. The thirteen leaders were placed in irons and confined to the brig;
nevertheless, at around 5:15 that evening, the mutiny proceeded as planned. The coolies on
board the Napoleon Canevero broke apart their sleeping benches in order to use the planks of
wood and protruding nails as weapons against the crew. Some were even armed with knives and
spades, as well as a few cutlasses stolen from their guards. Thirty coolies were killed during the
first offensive by a volley of musket fire from the crew. Ignoring the captain’s calls for
surrender, the enraged and emboldened coolies began setting fire to the lower decks, and by then
1

For the purposes of this introduction, historiography, and the remainder of this thesis,
the term “coolie” will be used to specifically reference indentured Chinese laborers on
plantations in both Cuba and the American South. Scholars of Chinese indentured labor use the
term “coolie” to distinguish these laborers from other types of Chinese laborers; for example,
those who worked under the credit-ticket system in California (See: “Historiography” section).
Additionally, the bulk of primary documents refer to Chinese indentured labor in this manner.
1

it was clear that they would take the ship or die trying. As the fire raged, the crew lowered three
longboats into the sea in an attempt to escape the inferno, but only one of the boats avoided
being swamped by the rough waves of the Pacific Ocean. The crewmembers that were killed in
the uprising included the ship’s doctor and the interpreter who had first informed the officers of
the plot. The captain, his mate, and the majority of crewmembers were able to escape in the
surviving longboat. Shortly thereafter, the fire raging through the lower decks of the Napoleon
Canevero finally reached the eight thousand boxes of firecrackers in the cargo hold. None of the
six hundred sixty-three coolies on board survived.2
This harrowing story of mutiny aboard a Chinese coolie transport ran in both The New
Orleans Times and Times-Picayune in late June, 1866, adding to the growing body of newspaper
articles referencing Chinese coolies in Louisiana after the Civil War. This interest in the
international coolie trade, especially for New Orleans newspapers and the wealthy Louisianans
that read them, is a symptom of how white sugar planters began circulating the idea of importing
a new labor force to work on their plantations, at least as early as November, 1865.3 After the
Civil War, the Reconstruction Era had become a period of intense transformation in the power
structures that had governed the antebellum plantation society in Louisiana. Economically,
Louisiana’s defeat in the Civil War meant that the immense prosperity and wealth that white
sugar planters had previously enjoyed was in severe jeopardy due to the sudden lack of a stable,
predictable, and cheap labor force since the Thirteenth Amendment had freed enslaved people
from bondage. Antebellum sugar plantations produced the second most profitable crop in the
slaveholding South, and the hundreds of enslaved people who worked on these plantations were

“Terrible Fight with Coolies,” Times-Picayune, June 21, 1866; “Burning of a Coolie
Ship—Six Hundred and Seventy-Two Lives Lost,” New Orleans Times, June 22, 1866.
3
“The Coolie Question,” Times-Picayune, November 7, 1865.
2
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almost as economically valuable as the sugar that their labor produced.4 Socially, white
supremacy’s powerful grip on Louisiana’s plantation society had started to loosen as freedmen
began to demand fair compensation for their labor, and outright refused to work for less than
they were worth. Newspapers throughout Louisiana vilified these freedmen, calling them lazy
and insisting that Black Americans could not exist without white guidance. They concluded that
freedmen could only be compelled to work by force or coercion, and white Louisiana planters
began to look for a means to reclaim the labor force over which they had once held supreme
authority.5
White Louisianans soon found inspiration in the plantation system in Cuba, as well as in
the credit-ticket labor system that was developing in California. These two labor systems,
although different in overall structure, both relied on imported Chinese workers to fulfill their
agricultural demands. Louisiana sugar planters were particularly interested in the Coolie system
employed in Cuba, another lucrative sugar economy. In Cuba, white sugar planters procured
indentured Chinese laborers, usually under contracts of five to eight years, in order to work
alongside enslaved Africans on their sugar plantations; however, many Cuban planters routinely
extended or renewed these contracts by nefarious means in order to exploit these coolies
indefinitely. White Cuban planters began adding coolies to their enslaved plantation labor force
in order to prevent a Haitian-style slave uprising in Cuba. Their goal was to racially dilute the
enormous enslaved population by pitting the Chinese laborers against their enslaved African
counterparts in order to significantly reduce the possibility of a unified labor force that could
overthrow the white power structures in place in Cuba. Reports from Cuba indicated to white
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Louisiana planters that Chinese laborers were more docile, industrious, and harder working than
the enslaved Africans, and above all, they would accept tremendously low wages without
complaint. These reports convinced many Louisiana sugar planters to begin the process of
acquiring indentured Chinese laborers to work in the sugarcane fields of south and central
Louisiana. Their reasoning for employing Chinese coolies was similar to that of the Cuban
planters, as the white Louisiana planters intended to use Chinese laborers to undermine
freedmen’s attempts to gain economic and social equity within the Reconstruction plantation
system. The Louisiana planters’ intentions for Chinese coolies on sugar plantations were
threefold. First, since they believed that the Chinese would work for extremely low wages while
under contract, the planters foresaw the opportunity to introduce a new ethnic working class on
their plantations, one that paternalistic white supremacy could exploit. Second, by employing
Chinese laborers for exceedingly low wages, the planters could rob freedmen of their economic
leverage and force Black laborers to accept minimal wages equal to the Chinese coolies. Third,
because Chinese coolies worked under contract, Louisiana planters could once again have a
captive labor force that could be guaranteed for at least five years, and these workers could not
seek employment elsewhere without either first receiving permission from the planter or buying
out their individual contracts themselves.6
Resistance in the United States to the so-called “coolie trade” came from government, the
American citizenry, and the coolies themselves. The United States government grew concerned
over the coolie trade making its way onto American shores due to fears of white Southern
planters attempting to reinvigorate the slave trade with a new ethnic group. American officials

“Chinese Labor,” Times-Picayune, August 8, 1869; “The Future of Southern Labor,”
New Orleans Times, November 12, 1865; “The Coolie Question,” Times-Picayune, November 7,
1865.
6
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had been reporting on the deplorable conditions used to transport and house Chinese coolies
since before the Civil War, and they drew comparisons to the conditions of enslaved people in
the United States. The United States government formally outlawed the coolie trade in 1862;
however, Louisiana planters argued that the imported Chinese laborers were not coolies by
definition, as they had come to Louisiana not by way of coercion, but under their own volition.
In addition, Republicans in both the Louisiana and Federal Legislatures, along with Black
leaders, recognized the intentions Louisiana planters had for using Chinese labor, and
Republicans argued that the planters’ plans were a means to economically disenfranchise
freedmen. Racism also played a factor in resistance to Chinese labor in Louisiana, as some in
both the Democratic and Republican Parties viewed the Chinese as uncivilized and ethnically
inferior to white Americans, and that the addition of a new racial group would upset the already
delicate racial landscape of Reconstruction-era Louisiana. They argued that the Chinese were
un-Christianized and morally corrupt, often engaging in homosexuality, drug abuse, theft, and
violent actions. The greatest form of resistance to coolies in Louisiana came from the coolies
themselves. Upon their arrival to Louisiana, coolies quickly learned that the same power
structures that had exploited them in Cuba were attempting to exploit them in the same manner
on domestic sugar plantations. However, they also soon realized that Federal and State
Government agencies were not interested in enforcing these power structures in the same way
that the government in Cuba had. Coolies routinely asserted their agency by engaging in work
stoppages or abandonment without fear of arrest or enforcement of their contracts by the United
States. As a result, the practice of coolie labor in Louisiana halted as abruptly as it began as
sugar planters began to realize that the Chinese were not nearly as docile as they had originally
believed. This Chinese resistance to exploitation, coupled with the government’s lack of

5

willingness to enforce planters’ nefarious labor contracts caused sugar planters in Louisiana to
suffer further losses to their already dubious economic standing, and they quickly abandoned any
attempt to recreate the exploitative coolie labor system of Cuba in Louisiana.
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Historiographical Review
Scholarly work on Chinese labor in both Latin and North America has examined how the
addition of indentured Asian workers to current and former slave economies affected the social
geographies and international relationships among the nations and societies that participated in
the so-called “Coolie Trade.” Prominent scholars like Lisa Yun, Kathleen López, Evelyn HuDeHart, Benjamin Narvaéz, and Moon-Ho Jung have all lent their individual perspectives to the
study of the importation of contracted Chinese labor and its effects on the Americas. Race
relations, local and global economics, political hypocrisy, and even international intrigue are all
cogs in the wheel of this particular body of historical scholarship. The global reach of the coolie
trade was vast, involving a cast of characters including seafarers from New England, Her
Majesty’s Coroners in British Hong Kong, Southern Planters from the recently defeated
Confederate States, bat guano dealers in Peru, and revolutionary freedom fighters in Spanish
Cuba. For the purposes of this review, as well as in the interest of brevity, the focus will
primarily remain on indentured Chinese laborers in Cuba and Louisiana.
Historical background is important in any scholarly pursuit, and geographer Richard
Campanella and scholar Melinda Chow provide adequate background information on coolie
migration to Louisiana. Campanella acknowledges the Louisiana connection to Cuba, asserting
that Louisiana sugar planters “sought guidance from their Caribbean peers on how to replace
‘their’ labor force” because defeat in Civil War meant “freedom came to the sugar fields.”7
Melinda Chow’s work agrees with Campanella inasmuch as “Chinese men replaced slave labor
at sugar plantations in Jefferson Parish,” but she makes no mention of the Cuban origin of these

Richard Campanella, “Chinatown, New Orleans,” Preservation in Print (November
2013): 16.
7

7

Chinese laborers.8 These articles provide an adequate basis for understanding the history of the
coolie trade, but a number of other scholars are able to shed more light on the Cuban system of
coolie labor and how it relates to the sugar plantations of Louisiana.
Both Louisiana and Cuba were highly racialized societies during the mid-nineteenth
century, and the scholarship on the subject tends to agree that both the Cuban and United States’
governments had difficulty in deciding how to racially classify Chinese laborers. Chow asserts
that the Chinese in the American South were legally “considered ‘colored’,” but that society “in
the Mississippi Delta came to see the Chinese as having a social identity ‘between black and
white’.”9 Evelyn Hu-DeHart agrees with Chow’s assessment as to where the Chinese fit in the
racial hierarchies of Cuba and the American South. Hu-DeHart goes further, contending that
powerful white planters in Cuba saw the Chinese as “ensuring the continuation of the colonial
enterprise by forming a class ‘in-between’ whites…and Africans…at the bottom of society.”10
They also contend that whites in Cuba “perceived Asian migrants as more industrious, more
economical, and less threatening than Africans.”11 Kathleen López also agrees with this idea of
racial buffering, contending “the Chinese held an ambiguous position in the…racial and social
hierarchy” in Cuba, and the “Spanish colonial government did not have a plan for Asians, legally
classified as white but socially considered de color.”12 Scholar Oriol Regué-Sendrós writes, “the

Melinda Chow, “Chinese,” in The New Encyclopedia of Southern Culture, vol. 24,
Race, ed. Thomas C. Holt, Laurie B. Green, and Charles Reagan Wilson (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2013), 200.
9
Melinda Chow, “Chinese,” in The New Encyclopedia of Southern Culture, 200.
10
Evelyn Hu-DeHart and Kathleen López, “Asian Diasporas in Latin America and the
Caribbean: an Historical Overview,” Afro-Hispanic Review 27, no. 1, Afro-Asia (Spring 2008):
16.
11
Evelyn Hu-DeHart and Kathleen López, “Asian Diasporas in Latin America and the
Caribbean,” 16.
12
Kathleen López, “Afro-Asian Alliances: Marriage, Godparentage, and Social Status in
Late-Nineteenth-Century Cuba,” Afro-Hispanic Review 27, no. 1, Afro-Asia (Spring 2008): 61.
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exclusion of the Chinese population from the rights of white people was legally enforced because
they challenged the fundamental pillars of colonial society.”13 Benjamin Narvaéz expands this
idea by explaining that government officials used race as a justification to begin bringing coerced
Chinese labor to Cuba as early as the 1840s. The goal, Narvaéz writes, was to dilute the
enormous African slave labor force in Cuba in order to prevent a Haitian-style rebellion. The
Cuban government endorsed this racially presumptive solution partly because “Chinese
workers…were neither European…nor black, which assuaged racial anxieties.”14 ReguéSendrós agrees with Narvaéz, stating, “since the allegedly planned slave revolt of 1844…Spanish
metropolitan authorities and planters conceived of the overall black population…as a threat to
existing social and imperial arrangements” and that Spanish officials “promptly invoked the
policy of the balance of the races as soon as they began their discussion on the Chinese
Migration.”15 Lisa Yun also echoes this “spectre of another…revolution,” arguing that “the
radicalized…Haiti that led to the overthrow of the white elite provided lessons to the Cuban
landowning class.”16 In all, it seems that most scholars on the subject of coolie labor in the
Americas agree that Chinese laborers served as a racial buffer between black and white, mainly
due to fears of Black resistance and revolution.
While the ambiguous racial status of coolies may have assuaged the fears of white
authorities in Cuba, the historiography suggests that the consensus among white Southerners
during the decade before the Civil War was initially more hostile to Chinese labor. Lisa Yun
Oriol Regué-Sendrós, “Chinese migration to Cuba: Racial Legislation and Colonial
Rule in the Mid-Nineteenth-Century Spanish Empire,” Journal of Iberian and Latin American
Studies 24, no. 2, (August 2018): 282.
14
Benjamin N. Narvaéz, “Abolition, Chinese Indentured Labor, and the State: Cuba,
Peru, and the United States during the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” The Americas 76, no. 1
(January 2019): 10.
15
Oriol Regué-Sendrós, “Chinese migration to Cuba,” 281.
16
Lisa Yun, The Coolie Speaks (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008), 12.
13
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argues that “the Asian laborer was a vexing figure for American politics: neither black nor
white, Asian laborers were ostensibly voluntary yet involuntary.”17 According to Narvaéz,
“during the 1850s, a minority of Americans looked to Cuba…and advocated Chinese indentured
labor for the South.”18 However, Narvaéz also admits that most Southerners during this period
“temporarily joined the chorus against Chinese immigration and coolie labor.”19 According to
Narvaéz, this anti-Chinese sentiment was due to the general complacency of labor among
Southern planters provided by the highly successful and lucrative system of slavery that was well
established by the 1850s. Southerners also voiced concerns that the Chinese “represented an
uncivilized race that would morally corrupt slaves,” seemingly the opposite of the idea of racial
dilution adopted by Cuban planters.20 The seminal work on the subject of Chinese indentured
labor in Louisiana is Coolies and Cane, by historian Moon-Ho Jung. Jung outlines the economic
ideology behind importing Chinese labor to Louisiana, as well as the social and political
ramifications of incorporating a new ethnic group into an already highly racialized society.
Moon-Ho Jung echoes the findings of Narvaéz, namely that Southern elites thought that trade in
coolies would undermine the African slave system in the United States, as they “demanded the
exclusion of coolies from American shores so as to preserve domestic slavery.”21
Defeat in the Civil War soon changed these notions, and after the slave system of the
South collapsed and freedmen demanded higher wages, Louisiana planters began to look to
coolies as an alternative labor force for their sugar plantations. Jung acknowledges the important
cultural and economic relationship between Cuba and Louisiana, and he asserts that these ties
17

Lisa Yun, The Coolie Speaks, 22.
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“deepened immediately after the Civil War, with many Confederates finding a haven in the
Spanish Colony.”22 Benjamin Narvaéz agrees that some Southerners looked to Cuba as a model
for delaying or remedying the growing tide of emancipation during Reconstruction. He explains
how Southerners believed they “could delay the rise of free labor,” as well as upholding the
notion that the Chinese “were inexpensive, hardworking, intelligent, and skilled” when compared
to freedmen.23 He also asserts that the Southern “rhetoric switched from coolies undermining
slavery to coolies saving the social and economic order,” and Southerners “insisted that the
Chinese would create labor competition and force freedmen to accept lower wages.”24 Yun
agrees with Narvaéz’s assessment, writing, “plantation society of the American South became
occupied with possibilities for Chinese labor, with the Caribbean Chinese coolies playing a
significant part in the debates and in plantation cultural and economic logic.”25 Jung also notices
this shift in the Southern opinion of Chinese labor, as “the landing of Chinese workers in
postemancipation Louisiana by way of Cuba magnified the ambiguities surrounding coolies in
American culture,” and planters began to see the Chinese as “an ideal migrant labor force, much
superior to Louisiana’s freedpeople.”26 Narvaéz explains “by [1867], labor recruiters from
Louisiana succeeded in introducing a few hundred Chinese workers from Cuba” and that
“various Southern labor conventions…promoted coolie labor, and planters…formed joint-stock
companies dedicated to recruiting these workers.”27 Jung agrees with Narvaéz and his
assessment of planter interest in coolies, stating “Louisiana planters and merchants
simultaneously set out to import coolies en masse, fully expecting an endorsement of their
22

Moon-Ho Jung, Coolies and Cane, 76.
Benjamin N. Narvaéz, “Abolition, Chinese Indentured Labor, and the State,” 16.
24
Benjamin N. Narvaéz, “Abolition, Chinese Indentured Labor, and the State,” 18.
25
Lisa Yun, The Coolie Speaks, 22.
26
Moon-Ho Jung, Coolies and Cane, 84.
27
Benjamin N. Narvaéz, “Abolition, Chinese Indentured Labor, and the State,” 31.
23

11

project from the state legislature.”28 This newfound market niche for coolie labor saw “various
merchant houses [that] took concrete steps to supply and profit from the bourgeoning market for
coolies.”29 Although Louisiana planters scrambled to import coolies to work on their sugar
plantations, the Republican-led government in Washington was not keen on allowing coolie
labor into the Reconstruction Southern States. Narvaéz presents evidence that “Republicans
passed resolutions in both houses of Congress condemning coolie labor in the United States and
the rest of the Americas.”30 Jung’s findings mirror those of Narvaéz, citing “unanimous
resolutions against the coolie trade by the House and Senate” led by Charles Sumner and
Secretary of State Seward.31 This resistance from the federal government prompted northern
journalists to compare the coolie trade to an attempted renewal of Southern slavery “that
resonated with antebellum images and fears” among the residents of the North.32 Richard
Camapnella suggests “the U.S. Government…viewed it as a dangerously close substitute for
slavery.”33 Furthermore, the Reconstruction-era Louisiana legislature was equally hostile to the
importation of coolie labor. Narvaéz suggests “a relatively strong US federal government and its
Republican allies in state government…were generally anti-planter, increasingly feared the
Chinese as a racial group, and believed coolie labor was akin to slavery.”34 Jung agrees that, in
Louisiana, the government desired to quell Chinese immigration while boosting European
immigration due to fears of a new racial influence. He suggests that “Louisiana worshipped the
gospel of white immigration” during Reconstruction, and that many saw the Chinese as “unfit for

28
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the drudgery of the constant…toil of the plantations.”35 He goes further, suggesting “in
Louisiana…coolies solidified ‘immigrants’ as European and white in the age of emancipation,
the latter’s arrival acclaimed as the key to the redemption of the region and the nation.”36
Camapnella continues this idea of white immigration, writing “Louisiana planters by the early
1870s began to look elsewhere for contract labor—to Spain, Portugal, Greece, and finally
Sicily.”37 According to the historiography, Republican mistrust of both the Southern planters
and the Chinese immigrants themselves, Northern fears of slavery’s resurgence, and white
Southern insistence on European immigration are the factors that created an increasingly hostile
environment for the coolie trade in the United States and Louisiana.
Although the scholars writing about this subject agree that the Chinese coolie laborers
created a racial buffer between black and white in Cuba, as well as inflamed Republican
hostilities in the United States, they also recount that the treatment of the laborers was often
brutal, their life expectancy was short, and their existence was riddled with hypocrisy. Lisa
Yun’s research suggests “coolies endured slave conditions, due to the unenforceability of a
contract that provided for certain conditions…subject to the interpretation of the master.”38 She
addresses the staggering death toll among coolies in Cuba: “over 50 percent…died before their
eight-year contract ended.”39 Yun concludes her grim assessment of coolie life in Cuba by
suggesting that they “became maximally exploited” and “could be disposable or unfree at any
time, depending on the vagaries of the system and the master.”40 Narvaéz admits that Cuban
officials had passed laws designed to protect coolie laborers from mistreatment, ensuring “ships
35
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were not overcrowded and had proper ventilation and sufficient food, water, and medical
supplies;” however, in practice, “Cuban officials inspected ships, but rarely criticized or
punished coolie traders for high fatality rates.”41 Narvaéz also agrees with Yun on the basis of
predatory contracts, and that, by signing these contracts, coolies “temporarily gave up civil
rights,” and, what few rights they had “were poorly defined, which opened the door to abuse.”42
He compares Cuban laws intended to protect coolies in Cuba to the laws governing the
movements of enslaved Africans. The “colonial government…strove to keep Chinese laboring
while under contract” and it created a registry to prevent planters “from forcing coolies to work
beyond the contract, but…also made it easier to track down runaways.”43 Similarly, Hu-Dehart
and López draw parallels between the Chinese coolie trade and African slave trade. They
comment on how “Chinese coolies and African slaves were transported on the same ships,
labored on the same plantations, and engaged in similar means of resistance.”44 These scholars
agree that life and labor for the Chinese coolies in Cuba was harsh and full of legal hypocrisy
and loopholes designed to take their freedom well past the end of their eight-year period of
servitude. The mistreatment they endured from their employers was congruent to that of
enslaved Africans, and their death tolls were staggering as a result.
Racial disparities and mistreatment in any society spark class conflict, and the historical
consensus suggests that the Chinese coolie experience was no different, especially in terms of
organized resistance. Coolies engaged in various forms of resistance both in Cuba and
Louisiana, as well as on the very ships that transported them to their places of employment. Lisa
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Yun cites the coercion by Cuban and Spanish sailors as an impetus for coolie resistance, leading
to “rebellion…on ships because methods of procuring coolies primarily involved kidnapping by
force and deceiving individuals to board ships—then entrapping them.”45 She notes how “the
captive Chinese violently resisted their circumstances, causing embarrassing reports that were
published and sensationalized.”46 She concludes that many coolies turned to violent forms of
resistance, explaining that during the Ten Years’ War in Cuba, many “Chinese escaped the
plantations and made the ‘transition’ to free labor through mass rebellion and war.”47 Kathleen
López also acknowledges the Ten Years’ War as a “struggle that enticed slaves and indentured
laborers with the promises of freedom in exchange for their services and loyalty.”48 She
continues on this point in another article, along with Hu-DeHart, writing “contrary to their image
as weak and docile, Asians resisted oppression from the beginning.”49 Ritual suicides could also
be seen as a form of Chinese resistance, especially for coolies in Cuba. Margaret Mih Tillman,
et al., acknowledge, “plantation elites could characterize suicide as ‘heathen’ behavior, [but]
suicide from a Chinese perspective could be seen as voicing active protest against an unjust
system.”50 Narvaéz gives even more examples of the various forms of coolie resistance, citing
how they “slowed their work, struck, practiced sabotage, stole, petitioned officials, saved money
to buy out contracts and purchase certificates of freedom, forged documents, ran away,
committed suicide, and individually or collectively attacked and murdered their superiors.”51 He

45

Lisa Yun, The Coolie Speaks, 18.
Lisa Yun, The Coolie Speaks, 28.
47
Lisa Yun, The Coolie Speaks, 33.
48
Kathleen López, “Afro-Asian Alliances,” 60.
49
Evelyn Hu-DeHart and Kathleen López, “Asian Diasporas in Latin America and the
Caribbean,” 16.
50
Margaret Mih Tillman et al., “Chinese Immigrants in Cuba Repository Collection,”
Chinese America: History and Perspectives (January 2016): 17.
51
Benjamin N. Narvaéz, “Abolition, Chinese Indentured Labor, and the State,” 15.
46

15

suggests that these actions had success in that they “cumulatively weakened this labor system by
making Chinese suffering visible to domestic and international eyes.”52 Richard Campanella
mentions that these types of Chinese resistance measures at least partly led to the coolie system
failing in Louisiana. He contends that “planters themselves were displeased to discover that the
allegedly ‘docile’ Chinese were in fact willing and able to fight for what was rightfully theirs”
and that “disparate pay and ill treatment were met with confrontation, work stoppage, and
lawsuits.”53 Narvaéz also agrees with Campanella on coolie resistance in Louisiana, adding “the
Chinese demonstrated a refusal to work under harsh labor conditions and resentment of
violations of their contracts,” and this resistance proved economically destructive to planters as
“the investment in Asian workers turned into a major loss.”54 Jung agrees with Narvaéz and
Campanella on the subject of coolie resistance in Louisiana. He recounts how the “honeymoon
between Chinese recruits and their employers did not last long on most plantations.”55 He also
suggests that coolies resisted labor conditions in Louisiana by simply leaving their employers’
plantations for greener pastures, and that they “engaged in a strike…with their feet.”56 This type
of resistance action escalated when coolies realized that their employers were almost powerless
to stop the laborers from leaving, as “these movements, so at odds with the long-term contracts
that had brought them to Louisiana, became commonplace.”57 Jung revels in this ease of
movement, arguing that it “was a testament to the social integration of these so-called coolies
into Louisiana’s multilayered, multifaceted class struggles.”58 In all, coolie resistance took many
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different forms both in Cuba and Louisiana. From armed resistance to work stoppages to simply
running away, coolies asserted their agency over those who sought to disenfranchise them and
exploit their important labor capacity.
The historiography of Chinese indentured labor in Cuba and Louisiana contains a small
but dedicated group of scholars who tend to agree on nearly all aspects of coolie life in the
Americas. Their work has brought to light the resilience of these laborers as they sought to earn
a living in foreign and often hostile environments. Both foreign governments and wealthy white
elites attempted to exploit them, treat them as expendable slaves, and take advantage of their
seemingly “docile” nature. Although many coolies perished under the extreme conditions and
mistreatment thrust upon them, especially in Cuba, their insistence on agency, fair labor
practices, and the use of both violent and non-violent forms of resistance demonstrate how the
study of these laborers can aid historians in gaining a deeper knowledge of race, white
supremacy, immigration, and collective action within the context of nineteenth century
plantation societies.

17

Section One: Cuban Exploitation of Coolie Labor
The Cuban sugar economy of the nineteenth century was one of the largest, if not the
largest, in the Americas. During the mid-nineteenth century, Cuba accounted for 21 percent of
world sugar production, around 161,000 tons annually. By 1870, sugar production in Cuba had
reached an annual figure of 703,000 tons (41 percent of world production), dwarfing the next
largest sugar economy, Puerto Rico, which had produced 105,000 tons the same year.59 In order
to increase sugar production, Cuban planters supplemented their more expensive slave labor
force with more inexpensive coolie laborers. Coolies in Cuba were cheaper to hire and required
less capital and investment on behalf of the planter than African slaves. Between 1851 and 1855,
the average price of an African slave in Cuba was 410 pesos, whereas the average price of a
coolie hovered around 150 pesos.60 Coolies were less expensive to buy and more expendable
than African slaves, given the nature of their contractual indentured status.
The conditions coolies faced, both on the passage from China and once in Cuba, were
indeed difficult and brutal. The Chinese laborers endured long voyages and squalid conditions
on coolie ships, as well as harsh treatment and backbreaking labor on the sugar plantations of
Cuba. Officials designed laws to keep coolies working indefinitely, even after their period of
indenture was complete, and they were also subject to cruel punishment if they escaped their
captivity.61 The wartime United States Congress passed anti-coolie legislation in 1862 propelled
by fears that the practice reflected the slave trade “at a time when the Cuban planters were
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largely adding to their laboring force by the purchase of this class of workers.”62 Not only did
coolie labor in Cuba resemble slavery, many of the coolie traders transporting laborers from
China had, as Benjamin Narvaéz suggests, “direct connections to the Atlantic slave trade,”
seemingly validating congressional fears about introducing the coolie trade in any capacity to the
United States.63 Cuban officials created further parallels to the African slave system by passing a
series of codes governing the movement of coolie laborers around Cuba. The laws required
planters to register any coolie labor in their employ with the government, which seemed like a
measure intended to reduce coolies working beyond their contracted period of indenture;
however, in practice, the system aided planters in the tracking of runaways and deserters.
Likewise, port officials reacted to high mortality rates aboard ships with apathy and indifference,
siding with the coolie traders even when mortality neared fifty percent. Furthermore, the
government in Cuba installed a colonial police force designed to suppress coolie and slave
rebellion; more often, they tracked runaway coolies for wealthy planters, using methods akin to
the slave patrols of the American South. Harboring coolie runaways also carried harsh penalties
and fines, even for white Cubans. If one harbored a runaway coolie and was discovered by the
colonial police, he or she would be fined up to 500 pesos, which was an enormous sum to most
everyday Cubans during the nineteenth century. In 1860, the government in Spain passed, by
royal decree, that coolies had two months to either re-contract or leave Cuba under threat of
forced hard labor. Because of this, Benjamin Narvaéz concludes, “ex-coolies had virtually no
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money for passage home, so this law essentially sentenced them to perpetual servitude” in one
facet or another.64
This slave-like treatment was the focus of a scathing article in the New York Herald,
which reported that twenty-three coolie laborers had arrived in New Orleans in July 1867, ready
to begin work on the sugar plantations of Louisiana. More importantly, however, the article
quotes the correspondent from Havana who reported on the living conditions coolie laborers
faced in Cuba. He reported “the number of Chinese coolies that died on the passage to this port
between the years 1847 and 1866 was 11,291 out of 90,019 shipped from Macao.”65
Additionally, “out of 11,462 that shipped this year from February 2 to June 30 the number that
died at sea was 1,360 souls” and “in one instance only 140 arrived out of 320 shipped.”66 This
report enumerates the staggering death toll for coolies making their way to Havana.
Furthermore, the coolies were “jammed into sheds, and die like rotten sheep” and “in some cases
the mortality after landing has reached seventy-five per cent of the cargo…in no case does it
average less than thirty-three per cent.”67 The remainder of the article further demonstrates the
fears of the return of Southern slavery that many in the North possessed:
Such is the picture in Havana. Shall we photograph it for the United States in the
face of our efforts for the negro, who was treated like a god in comparison to the
coolie? The coolie is generally engaged, for a short term of years, and in that
period the owner—no other term but owner applies—true to the inexorable
exactions of his money in his efforts to gain interest, crushes out and demands
every unit of physical force that can be found in the bone and sinew of the worse
than slave that yields to his power. Torn from his home under false
representations, packed into the pestilential hold of a ship for a voyage of four or
five months, fed on putrid beef and worm-eaten biscuits, brutally abused in most
cases by the officers of the ship, landed in the old slave markets of the West
Indies and our Southern States, and doomed to see his fellow sufferers sink
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around him at a rate of one out of every three after landing, we can find the
misery of no living human being that cries to humanity with a louder voice of
agony than the coolie.68
The comparison to the slave trade in the Southern United States in this article is clear, and the
writer uses the anguish that he witnessed from coolies in Cuba to stoke the fears of those in the
North into becoming wholly against the emergence of the coolie trade in the United States. It
also illuminates the brutal, slave-like conditions that coolies faced daily in Latin America.
Additionally, Peter Parker, the United States Commissioner and Minister Plenipotentiary
to China created a report investigating coolie treatment in China and Latin America. The report
highlighted an incident that took place on one particular coolie transport ship in October of 1855.
The report recounted how the coolies had made for the longboats after docking at Manila,
wrongly thinking that they had reached their destination, which caused the captain to order his
crew to fire upon the Chinese for supposed desertion. The crew then forced the coolie men into
the hold, closed all the hatches, and did not open them again for “some twelve or fourteen hours”
after which “it was discovered that nearly 300 of the unfortunate beings had perished from
suffocation.”69 Furthermore, the report assessed that many of the coolie laborers were “procured
by purchase, and are as truly the subject of barter and sale as the negroes on the coast of Africa,”
while native Chinese “brokers” were complicit in the sale of their countrymen.70 “Native
Chinese are employed to entice [the Coolies] from their homes,” and they were also “persuaded
from hope of profit to leave their friends” and “sometimes beguiled, sometimes kidnapped.”71
The report also includes that “over fifty thousand” coolies were shipped to Cuba from 1852 to
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1860 and that “the total number of deaths…during the period named was 7,842.”72 Normally,
the period of indenture for coolie laborers spanned “from five to eight years,” but it seemed that
many were retained longer than the contracted terms, and “those who have served in the first
term are powerless in the hands of a man who would desire to retain them if valuable, and who
would not be bound to support them if too enfeebled to work.”73 Parker’s report concludes by
focusing on the chilling monetary incentive for planters in Cuba to, quite literally, work their
coolie employees to death. The Chinese were lured to Cuba under promises that “at the end of
eight years, they would possess $384,” which was an enormous incentive for poorer Chinese
laborers, “to whom a cent a day is a very reasonable competence.”74 However, many planters in
Cuba had no intention of paying their indentured laborers at the end of their contract. “If their
owners wear them out in eight years, so that they die, he, of course, has nothing to pay,” or if
they somehow survive, the planter “sends them to some distant plantation, or sells them again for
another eight years.”75 Certain Cuban planters also trade in dead coolies. The planters would
falsely claim that a particular coolie had died, after which they could resell still living coolie to
another plantation under a new name for profit.76 The grim conclusion of Parker’s report was
that Chinese indentured laborers in Cuba almost never escaped their period of coerced labor,
many were seen as more valuable if they died, and most did not survive more than eight years
under the harsh conditions of the sugar plantations. In total, between 1847 and 1860, the death
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rate for coolies aboard ships from China to Cuba was around 12.5 percent, and the death rates of
coolies on sugar plantations is wholly unknown.77
The passage of an 1854 body of regulations in Cuba surrounding coolie labor further
compounded this problem. These new laws were seemingly designed to give coolie laborers
more autonomy, allowing them to buy out their contract at any time during their period of
indenture; however, in practice the regulations put more financial strain on the coolie laborer.
Coolies were now required to compensate their employer for any work missed due to injury or
illness as well as clothing and food, deducted from their monthly four-peso salary. If a coolie
were somehow able to earn and save enough of his salary to buy out his contract, he would have
to pay out current value of a coolie contract, rather than his contract’s original value. Due to this
monetary finagling by the Cuban planter class, many coolies were still financially indebted to
their master well after the end of his eight-year contract.78 This was the system of control and
oppression that the planters of Louisiana and the South wanted to introduce to the United States
as a replacement for slave labor after the Civil War. The Cuban sugar economy was indeed
successful due to coolie labor, but this system required the exploitation of its labor force by
coercion, breach of contract, and outright cruelty in order to reach its high level of economic
success.
While journalists of a number of prominent newspapers reported on the horrors of coolie
labor in Cuba and elsewhere, some newspapermen of the period, wholly dismissed the claims of
coolie mistreatment in China and Cuba, in direct opposition to the prevailing reports and
arguments of their colleagues. Coolies and their treatment are examined in another New York
Herald article from July 1869, exactly two years after the previous Herald article highlighting
77
78

Lisa Yun, The Coolie Speaks, 19-20.
Lisa Yun, The Coolie Speaks, 30.
23

the gross mistreatment of coolies was published. The writer of this curious article paints a
wholly different picture of coolie life than the previous article from the same newspaper. The
writer’s exact motivations are unclear, yet the article reads more like an advertisement for the
coolie trade and its inherent benefits for the American South and West than a report on actual
coolie practices. “That this coolie emigration enterprise will ultimately be perfectly successful
no one can doubt,” the article explains, and the writer predicts “the next ten years will give us an
enormous Chinese population, particularly in the South.”79 The writer acknowledges the anticoolie legislation passed by Congress in January 1862, but asserts that the legislation was a
Northern conspiracy and that it came about due to “a general state of ignorance” among “the
leading men in the New England states,” nothing more.80 In direct opposition to the previous
article, the writer comments the unparalleled safety, enormous size, and wealth of provisions
supposedly aboard the coolie ships. “The ships carrying coolies…are the best ventilated and
provisioned of any ships in the world,” the writer boasts, and they were provisioned “better than
any other class of emigrant vessels.”81 On mortality, the writer admits that death “sometimes
takes place in coolie ships,” but he blames dysentery from coolies eating undercooked rice for
high death rates on some ships. He cites practices stemming from “some captains’ sole ideas of
cleanliness are that the coolies…should be continually splashed with salt water” which “results
in the certain death of a large percentage of passengers.”82 The article mentions Cornelius
Koopmanschap as a main broker and “an oracle” on the subject of the coolie trade.83 A native of
Holland, Koopmanschap had developed connections in California, the West Indies, New York,
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and Hong Kong, eventually developing a thriving business as a Chinese labor contractor in San
Francisco. He had already imported over thirty thousand Chinese laborers to California by 1869,
and he sought to do the same in the American South, particularly in Memphis. Koopmanschap
and Company estimated that the cost of transporting laborers from China to the South would
equal roughly $100 per laborer, which was a relatively low sum compared to the cost of enslaved
people before the Civil War.84 The Herald article reads as a hit piece about Koopmanschap’s
plans to import Chinese labor, rather than a truthful report on the realities of coolie labor.
The realities for Chinese laborers in Cuba involved not only harsh labor conditions and
exploitation from the ruling class, but also racial tensions marred by the ambiguous racial status
of the Chinese in Cuban society. In order to differentiate Chinese laborers from enslaved Black
Cubans, officials in Cuba routinely categorized them as persons who were legally white, but their
treatment by white Cubans suggests that they were seen as de color in practice. Their
occupational status in close proximity to slaves and the fact that they were controlled and
employed under contract saw their movements regulated as if they were enslaved Africans.85
Cuban planters saw them as easily exploitable because of their status as non-white and nonEuropean, and they did not number as much as enslaved Africans, which meant that they were
less prone to organized rebellion. The attitudes of the white Cuban public mirrored those of
white Southerners during Reconstruction. Whites viewed the Chinese as either positive or
negative based on whatever the convention of the day indicated. Many whites in Cuba saw the
Chinese as industrious workers who were a more positive social element than enslaved Africans.
At the same time, whites also saw the Chinese as racially inferior, physically weak, un-Christian,
and immoral. The Cuban government’s insistence on Catholicism as the official creed of the
84
85

Moon-Ho Jung, Coolies and Cane, 102-104.
Kathleen López, “Afro-Asian Alliances,” 60-61.
25

colony created a tense atmosphere for many Chinese, who were often viewed as idolaters. This
allowed Cuban officials to exclude Chinese from white society based on racial as well as
religious status. This added to the status of Chinese coolies as racially and religiously
ambiguous, excluding them from white society altogether. As a result of this exclusion, coolies
were racially and socially inferior and new laws governing coolies greatly resembled slave codes
in intention and practice.86 In addition, many whites feared white Cuban and Chinese interracial
marriage. Since the Chinese coolie population was overwhelmingly male, Cuban officials
perceived that it was only a matter of time before more race mixing occurred in a society where
race mixing was largely prohibited. Cuban officials began to promote the importation of
Chinese women, as well as encouraging the Chinese population to convert to Catholicism.87
By racializing the Chinese in this way, white Cubans were able to justify their treatment
and inhumane living conditions, both on ships and on the plantations. Another motive for the
introduction of coolie labor to Cuba was to assuage racial anxieties centered on slave rebellion
after the Haitian Revolution of 1791 to 1805. Coolies were cheaper and more expendable than
enslaved Africans, and having them work alongside slaves with white manipulation could prove
to dilute any spark of rebellion among the plantation labor force.88 This tactic seemed to have
worked, for a time, as tensions often flared between indentured Chinese workers and enslaved
Africans, and planter often manipulated this racialized environment for the benefit of control.
Overseers, when administering corporal punishment, would often force enslaved Africans to
hold down a coolie for flogging, or vice versa, thus elevating the racial tensions among the
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plantation labor. This racial divide only ended with the Ten Years’ War (1868-78) where
Chinese and Africans found a mutual enemy in the colonial forces that controlled Cuban
interests.89 For the Chinese in Cuba, rebellion could mean freedom from the harsh realities of
life on the plantations, as well as status as full and free members of society.90
Racist ideology among whites in Cuba, as well as cultural differences, led to the Chinese
coolies and enslaved Africans becoming a target for an 1864 decree labeling the Chinese as
immoral and in need of Christianizing. African slaves were prohibited from interacting with free
Blacks and mulatos for fears that they would promote unwanted ideas as well as further race
mixing. The Chinese, on the other hand, were seen as morally and sexually depraved, having
engaged in homosexual acts, which was often a normal act in Chinese culture. This behavior
was seen more as a curiosity, as it would be impossible for the Chinese to increase their number
in this way. The more concerning vices attributed to the Chinese were thefts, murders, and
gambling.91
By ethnically targeting the Chinese and classifying them as racially inferior, the Cuban
officials were able to keep them under their control and subject them to harsh treatment, slave
like conditions, and never ending servitude. They allowed racial anxieties surrounding the
enslaved African population to justify the importation of a new racial class that would be equally
exploited and also not enjoy the same economic, societal, and racial status as Cuban whites.
Coolie laws resembled slave codes both on paper and in practice, and slave patrols often rounded
up both Chinese coolies and enslaved Africans attempting to escape to freedom. Finally, it took
all out rebellion and the Ten Year’s war to give Chinese coolies and enslaved Africans a glimmer
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of hope at a life as full members of Cuban colonial society. The Coolie System in Cuba was
exploitative in intention and practice, and it would serve as an inspiration to white sugar planters
in Louisiana who were attempting to recuperate their economic losses that they brought about by
the Confederacy’s defeat in the Civil War.

28

Section Two: The Coolie Experiment in Louisiana
Antebellum sugar planters in Louisiana had once enjoyed one of the most lucrative
agricultural industries in the United States. Estimates suggest that the value of Louisiana sugar
rose around 150 percent during the 1850s, making it one of the most valuable Southern crops,
second only to South Carolina’s Sea Island cotton. The wealth these planters gained from sugar
in the decade before the Civil War was compounded by a significant increase in the value of
enslaved people in the Lower South. The average monetary value per enslaved person increased
from $925 in 1850 to $1658 after 1856. This shows a 79 percent increase in not only individual
value per slave, but also overall wealth for the Louisiana sugar planters with stable crops and
large holdings of enslaved people. 92 By looking at these staggering numbers, one can see why
sugar planters in Louisiana were intent on finding a cheap labor force in order to rebound from
the enormous economic strain and financial uncertainty that defeat in the Civil War and
Emancipation had caused.
The newspapers of New Orleans during the early Reconstruction period demonstrate the
growing uncertainty of white Louisianans as they witnessed their low-cost plantation labor force
evaporate with the emancipation of the enslaved Black population after the defeat of the
Confederacy. White Louisianans came to understand that “the agricultural interests of the South
have hitherto been almost entirely dependent upon negro labor,” and they lamented “the recent
war has, however, tended to render such labor altogether uncertain and unreliable.”93 White
planters and journalists began to spread the notion that Freedmen refused to work on the
plantations because they were morally bankrupted, lazy, and lacking in character. Newspapers

92

William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion, vol. 2, Secessionists Triumphant
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 20-21.
93
“The Future of Southern Labor,” New Orleans Times, November 12, 1865.
29

insisted that “the negro, having acquired his freedom, will not work unless compelled to do so,”
citing racist beliefs that requesting a fare wage for labor created “a life of idleness and
dissipation.” 94 At any rate, Freedmen’s refusal to work for low wages resulted in a large number
of planters fearing that their plantations would sit idle if they did not find a way to coerce
laborers to work for them. By 1865, planters in Louisiana began to worry about the future of
their plantations because they had concluded that the newly emancipated “freedmen cannot be
depended on in the cultivation of the staples on a large scale, without the introduction of some
competing industry.”95 Planters needed a new labor force, and correspondence accounting
Chinese labor in California began to find its way into Louisiana newspapers. White Louisianans
took notice of these articles, especially those specifically detailing that the Chinese would work
“twelve to fourteen hours a day, without even asking for Sundays,” and that the Chinese were
“patient, submissive, enduring, and teachable.”96 These articles placed the blame for the
economic and labor troubles in Louisiana on freedmen and the Republican-led government,
asserting that freedmen, “owing to the bad teaching of our Radical politicians, who…are
rendering them useless as laborers” would always fall short of Louisiana planters’ expectations,
thus “Chinese laborers will soon receive serious attention.”97 Because of freedmen’s insistence
on fair labor practices, many planters in Louisiana had come to see them as a nuisance that cost
money through both high wages if they were working, and low yields if they refused to work.
Louisiana planters, albeit begrudgingly for some, began to look to coolie labor as an alternative
to Black labor. They took inspiration from the economic success and racially exploitative
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methods of the coolie labor system on sugar plantations in Cuba. The island became a starting
point for the importation and implementation of coolies to Louisiana.
Sugar was the staple crop in both Louisiana and Cuba, so it is not surprising that
Louisiana planters received word from Havana about the so-called success of coolie labor. The
precedent for this Southern interest in Cuba took place during the decade before the Civil War,
wherein both filibusters and slaveholders in the Southern States pushed for the United States to
annex Cuba in order to expand their slaveholding territories after the Mexican War. In 1854,
James Buchanan, then minister to England under President Franklin Pierce, attended a
conference at Ostend, Belgium, where he, along with two other American ambassadors, issued
the Ostend Manifesto, formally calling on the United States to purchase Cuba from Spain under
threat of war, and create new slaveholding territories for the United States. President Pierce,
perhaps remembering congressional division the Mexican War or possibly recoiling from the
threat of another Wilmot Proviso, instead pursued the Gadsden Purchase the same year as a
suitable alternative. During his tenure as president, James Buchanan again entertained the idea
of purchasing or annexing Cuba, but Congress ultimately disapproved of the measure.98 Because
of this antebellum interest in bringing Cuba into the United States, one can readily assume that
Southerners knew about the systems in place in the plantations of the island, and remembered
them after the Civil War. Even international writers had debated the merits of purchasing Cuba
in 1859. The New York Herald reprinted an article from the French newspaper La Patrie, which
argued that the “only means of effectively destroying the [slave] trade was to assure the planters
cheap labor” and to “introduce coolies into Cuba.”99 This entrenched interest in Cuba, coupled
with reports that “the introduction of coolies into Cuba has enabled planters of that island to
98
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double their productions” reached the ears of Louisiana planters, and they began to seriously
consider importing coolie labor to work their sugar crop.100 Louisiana planters saw the necessity
of introducing coolies onto their plantations in order to recuperate their losses from the economic
instability brought about by the Civil War. They also intended to use the Chinese as an ethnic
group to coerce the submission of Freedmen, just as white Cuban planters had intended to use
the Chinese to racially dilute their African slave population.
Quick to respond to Southern interest in importing coolies from Cuba, advertisements for
Chinese immigration companies aimed at “Planters of the South” appeared in Louisiana
newspapers, advertising that the solution to their labor problem could be “most readily found in
the vast and overflowing population of China,” and that “the cheapness of coolie labor” could aid
in the “production of Southern staples.”101 It seemed as though white Louisianans were in
agreement that Chinese coolie labor would be a viable option to restore Louisiana sugar
production to its former high economic status. They argued that coolies were cheaper to pay and
more docile than freedmen, but still racially inferior, creating a labor pool ripe for exploitation.
The low wages offered to Chinese labor would also, in turn, force freedmen to accept lower
wages themselves, or be priced out of the labor market altogether.102
Newspapers in Louisiana were also convinced that “the negroes will never work on the
plantations voluntarily, as long as they know they constitute the only class upon which the
planter can rely for the cultivation of their plantations.”103 They wrote that planters were in need
of “other labor” to “compel the negro to habits of thrift and industry…by means of competition.”
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In other words, they believed that it was necessary to force Black laborers to accept lower

wages for more work by creating false competition from a newly imported racial group in the
form of the Chinese. More reports from California, where the Chinese population numbered
over 100,000 by 1869, strengthened Southerners resolve to incorporate coolie labor into their
plantation system. A letter printed in the Times-Picayune from Judge Dargan of Mobile,
Alabama, to General Clanton in Montgomery about his experiences with the Chinese in San
Francisco outlines the vision many Southerners had for the future of labor on plantations.
Dargan fervently believed that Chinese labor would be the way forward for the South, and the
addition of coolies would return plantations to their former high economic standing, and the
“rich farms now lying idle would bloom again, our commerce would flourish, and we would talk
of ‘hard times’ as things that had been.”105 The Alabaman echoes the feelings of many
Louisiana planters, namely that the South should introduce a new racial class for labor on the
plantations, and his report concludes that the Chinese are “skillful workingmen, and industrious
and frugal,” and also “the very class for our country.”106 He continues by explaining how the
Chinese can be used to undercut the wages of other laborers, thus creating more wealth for the
employer. He argues, “they can be employed to great advantage, and at exceedingly cheap
rates.”107 Dargan goes further, writing that “once employed, [the Chinese] will work faithfully,
and not bother themselves about suffrage;” an assertion that the Chinese are a more easily
manipulated racial group, and, unlike Freedmen, would not demand full participation in
governmental processes.108 He concludes his correspondence by informing General Clanton
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that, with his help, he hopes to import coolies into the South to “recover from the fearful state it
is now in.”109 Politically, many Southern Democrats saw the importation of coolie labor as a
way to challenge the Fifteenth Amendment by introducing an undesirable voting class that would
cause Republicans to regret granting the vote to all American men. These Democrats sought to
use the Chinese as an economic weapon against Freedmen and a political weapon against their
Republican adversaries.110 “Admit to our principle and you will exclude the African and the
Asiatic; deny it in regard to the African and adhere it to the Asiatic, and you proclaim yourselves
arrant knaves and hypocrites,” the New Orleans Times proclaimed.111 Based on these newspaper
articles and personal correspondence, one could argue that Louisiana sugar planters seemed to
revel in the idea of introducing a new labor force to their plantations that would secure both
cheap labor from the Chinese and cheaper labor from the freedmen.
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Section Three: Resistance from All Sides
Although many planters, journalists, and businessmen argued that coolie labor could help
jumpstart the Louisiana sugar industry during Reconstruction, many whites in the South were
opposed to introducing this new Asian ethnic group on racial grounds. Opposition to the socalled “Coolie Question” was often fierce, especially during the early years of Reconstruction in
Louisiana. Some white Louisianans did not look at the Chinese as a viable labor force, but as an
alien ethnic group that would upset the already tense racial atmosphere of early Reconstruction
Louisiana. Racist attitudes related to the ethnic status of the Chinese as a non-white, nonEuropean influence on Southern society began to arise, and many Southerners began to let
longstanding racial prejudices guide their thinking, rather than the reality of harsh labor
conditions and disenfranchisement often found in sugar plantation society. An article in The
New Orleans Times warned, “we can only regard the introduction of this element of Asiatic life
into our country as one fraught with the most disastrous consequences to its best interests.”112
The writer continues his prejudiced assault, suggesting that the Chinese were “debased heathens,
half human, half devil, which the ameliorating influences of Christianity could never elevate to
the standard of common decency.”113 Others argued that Chinese laborers would be far too alien
to employ in the South. In June 1867, the Daily Picayune suggested that “the negro slaves
were…very far from being a highly enlightened class,” but, unlike the Chinese, Black laborers
still “possessed the elements of the English language and the Christian religion.”114 The writer
states that “not one of these advantages belongs to the laborer from the Orient,” and a coolie
“comes from his home physically as well as mentally depressed, with constitutional tendencies
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and propensities foreign to our clime and race.”115 Many in the United States, both in the North
and South, viewed the Chinese as racially inferior to whites and incapable of living in a
“civilized” society like war-scarred Louisiana. Consequently, many in Louisiana began to
suggest that sugar planters look to Europe to meet their labor needs on plantations.116 The White
League added to this outcry for European labor solidarity, and they began to use their
Democratic allies to push planters to employ European laborers over Chinese laborers and
Freedmen.117 Fears of upsetting the racial order led to the belief that “Germany, Ireland, France
and the other nations of Western Europe…will find themselves…provided with permanent
situations, and compelled to labor, or willingly do so under the stimulus of competition.”118
Those advocating for white labor argued that a “good class of agricultural hands as Europe can
boast is likely to be furnished to portions of the country heretofore suffering labor dearth.”119
White, European laborers, they argued, would prove to be a better alternative than Chinese
coolies on the Louisiana sugar plantations, based on preconceived notions of race and social
hierarchy. These Euro-centric labor advocates created further hostility for sugar planters
interested in employing Chinese coolies.
The death-knell for the coolie system of Louisiana came from the Chinese themselves.
Planters had believed that coolies would be more agreeable and easier to manipulate than
Freedmen, but these preconceived ideas of coolie temperament soon disappeared as Chinese
laborers asserted their agency by refusing to be exploited like they were in Cuba. These laborers
began demanding days off and rest periods, to the chagrin of their plantations employers. They
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also demanded food and beverage rations, in addition to their labor wage, and refused to work if
these demands were not met. One incident that led to a riot and attack of an overseer on
Millaudon Plantation in 1870 demonstrated the tensions that arisen between the Chinese and
their overseers. During an argument with the Chinese laborers, an overseer fired a pistol and
struck a coolie in the arm. The entire company of Chinese attacked the overseer with cane
knives, and the other whites on the plantation had to help the overseer escape or be killed. The
Chinese refused then to work until the overseer had been arrested. Similar violent confrontations
between Chinese laborers and white employers at plantations across Louisiana ensued during the
early 1870s, many followed by Chinese strike or desertion. In some cases, Chinese laborers even
testified in open court against their white employers, something that would have been unheard of
in antebellum Louisiana.120 In the end, the Chinese had turned out to be less docile and more
resistant to exploitation than the Louisiana planters had originally hoped. Violent confrontations,
strikes, higher wages, court proceedings, and desertion had all taken their toll, both economically
and psychologically. These Chinese resistance measures, coupled with growing political
pressure from both Republicans and Democrats, caused many planters to abandon their
respective Chinese coolie experiments by the mid-1870s.
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Conclusion
It is rarely disputed that Louisiana sugar planters faced economic downturn immediately
following the Civil War. They had lost their entire enslaved workforce and much of their
investment wealth with the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, which in turn led to vacant
sugarcane fields and lost crops. These planters had held control over the bodies, labor, and lives
of enslaved people for generations, and they had amassed enormous wealth by engaging in
abusive and exploitative practices. In the end, the plantation system was so ingrained in the
social fabric of South Louisiana that these planters’ solution was to seek another non-white
ethnic group to exploit. These Sugar Barons found kindred spirits in the planters of Cuba, and
they sought to imitate the brutal Cuban plantation system that had ruined countless Chinese and
enslaved Africans, only to regain the wealth they had previously enjoyed from the forced labor
of their enslaved populations. They sought out what they thought would be a labor force that
could be easily manipulated for their own economic, social, and political gain. The Chinese,
however, would not be so easily controlled. They would not allow these planters to exploit
them, and they asserted their agency through both violent and nonviolent actions. Their refusal
to give up their dignity forced the sugar planters to abandon their attempts to create a new and
economically exploitable racial class in Louisiana that would also be pawns in economically
controlling the agency of laboring Freedmen on plantations.
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